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THE RESOLUTION OF REPRESENTATION
STATUS DISPUTES UNDER THE
TAYLOR LAW
JOSEPH R. CROWLEY*
IN 1967 the legislature of New York State, in enacting the Public Em-
ployees' Fair Employment Law (Taylor Law),' reaffirmed a long
standing statutory prohibition against strikes by public employees. The
legislature in this enactment, however, did not limit itself to this negative
approach but rather recognized a need "to assure public employees, who
are estopped from using the strike, that they have the right to negotiate
collectively."2 The implementation of this assurance took the form of not
only granting to public employees the right of organization and repre-
sentation but also requiring all public employers in the state to negotiate
with and enter into agreements with employee organizations representing
public employees.'
The declaration of the right to negotiate collectively will be meaning-
ful only if means and procedures to effectuate this legislative policy are
provided. The initial step in this effectuation is to establish procedures
for selecting negotiating representatives of public employees and for
resolving disputes involving representation status. In the law, the legis-
lature did establish certain standards for the resolution of representation
disputes,4 created the Public Employment Relations Board' (PERB)
and directed this Board to establish procedures for the resolution of
such disputes.'
The two primary issues in representation disputes are: first, the ap-
propriate unit, that is, what employees shall be grouped together for the
purpose of collective negotiations, and second, the selection of the em-
ployee organization to represent the employees so grouped together.
In order for the procedures created by the Taylor Law to encourage
labor-management harmony, the decisions and policies of the PERB must
be understood by all those concerned with public employee labor
problems. Thus, there is a need for a review of the experience of the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University, and Member of the New York State Public
Employment Relations Board.
1. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law art. 14 (Supp. 1968). This legislation is commonly known as the
Taylor Law.
2. N.Y. Governor's Comm. on Public Employee Relations 20 (1966) [hereinafter cited
Governor's Comm. Report].
3. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 200 (Supp. 1968).
4. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207 (Supp. 1968).
5. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 205(1) (Supp. 1968).
6. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 205(5) (a) (Supp. 1968).
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PERB in resolving various problems that arise with these representation
status disputes. This article will undertake that review. It will deal first
with ascertainment of the appropriate representation unit. Various factors
are involved in determining the unit: What do we mean by "the ap-
propriate unit"? Can a unit be appropriate where there is a conflict of
interest among the employees and to what degree must there be a com-
munity of interests? What role should the employer have in determining
the proper unit? Next, the selection of the employee organization will be
discussed. Relevant to this determination are the following questions:
What is an employee organization? How must the showing of interest be
made? How is the determination of majority status made? Finally, must'
the union agree in advance not to strike in order to be granted certifica-
tion?
I. THE SELECTION OF THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
A. Definition of the Appropriate Unit
The PERB, in entering upon its role as an adjudicator of representa-
tion status disputes, was mindful of the caveat that established "ar-
rangements developed for private industry cannot be literally transferred
to the public sector. . ."I Nevertheless private sector experience does
provide a repository of knowledge in the field of labor relations which
should not be ignored, but rather should be considered with the qualifica-
tion that any conclusion derived therefrom be modified to reflect the
problems and considerations unique to the public sector.
On the question of the "appropriate unit," the policy of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) appears to be well settled. In a repre-
sentation proceeding there is no requirement that the unit in issue be
found to be the most appropriate unit. Rather the question simply is
whether it is an appropriate unit. Thus the fact that other groupings of
employees would be as appropriate as the unit in issue, does not warrant
a denial of the unit sought unless the unit itself is inappropriate."
The policy of the NLRB in the private sector has been carried over to
the public sector in representation disputes involving employees in the
federal service. In representation questions involving such employees it
has been concluded almost without exception that the issue was not the
most appropriate unit but whether the unit sought by an employee
organization was an appropriate unitY
The decisions of the PERB represent a substantial departure from the
NLRB's policy. The Board and its Director of Representation have
7. Governor's Comm. Report at 21.
8. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1966).
9. See Rehmus, The Role of the Neutral in Public Employment Disputes, in The
Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts 253 (1967).
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required that the unit determined be the most appropriate unit.' ° This
departure from private sector policy and public sector experience in the
federal service is predicated upon the difference in the standards for
determining the appropriateness of a unit as established by Congress
through the National Labor Relations Act and Executive Order 10988 on
the one hand, and the New York State legislature on the other hand.
The Congress provided that: "The Board shall decide in each case
whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof .... 11 In the main, the implementation
of this legislative mandate has involved the question of whether the
employees in the proposed unit had such a community of interest that
they should be included in the same unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining. Similarly, section 6(a) of Executive Order 10988 provides in
part that: "Units may be established on any plant or installation, craft,
functional or other basis which will ensure a clear and identifiable com-
munity of interest among the employees concerned . . . ." Thus both
under the National Labor Relations Act and Executive Order 10988 the
factors considered in determining the appropriateness of a unit primarily
deal with the concept of community of interest.
However, the New York State legislature established three standards
to be utilized in defining the appropriate unit.' 3 The first of these pro-
vides: "the definition of the unit shall correspond to a community of
interest among the employees to be included in the unit .... ,n4 This
criterion is by its terms not dissimilar to the criterion utilized by the
NLRB or in unit determinations under Executive Order 10988. Accord-
ingly, the PERB in implementing this standard stated that "whether the
employees sought to be grouped together are subject to common working
rules, personnel practices, environment or salary and benefit structure,"'n
would be relevant factors. If this statutory criterion were the only one to
be applied in unit determination, the concept of a "most appropriate unit"
could not be sustained.
There are two further criteria to be considered. One provides that the
10. County of Rockland, 1 PERB ff 1-430 (1968); Malone CenL School Dist, 1
PERB 1-399.28 (1968); Central School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB 1-399.89 (1968).
11. 29 US.C. § 159(b) (1964). The specific provisions of this subsection dealing with
professional employees and crafts are not considered here.
12. 3 C.F.R. 521, at 524 (Comp. 1959-63). Other stated considerations such as whether
the group is homogenous, interchange of employees, and extent of common supervision all
have a definite bearing on whether there is in fact a substantial community of interest.
13. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207(1) (Supp. 1968).
14. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207(1)(a) (Supp. 1968).
15. PERB, Rules of Procedure 9 (1967).
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public employer at the level of the unit have the authority to agree to,
or to make effective recommendations with respect to the terms and con-
ditions to be negotiated.16 The other criterion requires that "the unit shall
be compatible with the joint responsibilities of the public employer and
public employees to serve the public."' 17 This criterion primarily concerns
the degree of administrative inconvenience to be experienced by unwar-
ranted fragmentation in the uniting of public employees." The PERB has
construed this statutory criterion to require the designation of as few
units as possible, consistent with the overriding requirement that the em-
ployees be permitted to form or join employee organizations of their own
choosing to represent them in a meaningful and effective manner.10 In
brief, the PERB's policy is that fragmentation of a public employer's
employees into small units is to be avoided unless there is present such
a conflict of interest as to preclude effective and meaningful collective
negotiations. To avoid such fragmentation, the Board has adopted the
"most appropriate unit" policy.
This "most appropriate unit" policy of the PERB has given rise to unit
determinations that at times do not coincide with any of the units sought
by the parties to the proceeding.20 Thus, the question arises whether the
PERB may define a unit which it deems to be most appropriate although
such a unit was not sought by any of the parties. The PERB determined
that it had such power.2' The Board reasoned that the statutory grant of
authority to resolve disputes concerning representation status did not
limit the exercise of this authority to the approval or disapproval of a
unit sought by a party or parties. Further, if the Board's authority were
so restricted, a representation dispute might be interminable in that it
would continue until a party petitioned for a unit which the Board could
find to be appropriate.
The "most appropriate unit" concept has been challenged by the fol-
lowing arguments: (1) it impedes organization of public employees,
(2) it deprives public employees of the right of selecting an employee
organization of their own choosing, and (3) it may totally deprive pub-
lic employees of representation. 2 However, to date the application of this
concept has not resulted in the deprivation of representation since there
always has been an employee organization present to represent the em-
ployees in the unit as defined. Furthermore, the right of public employees
16. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207(1) (b) (Supp. 1968).
17. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207(1)(c) (Supp. 1968).
18. Central School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB f[ 1-399.89 (1968); Governor's Comm. Report
at 28.
19. New York State, 1 PERB ff 1-424 (1968).
20. Board of Higher Educ., 1 PERB ff 1-407 (1968).
21. New York State, 1 PERB ff 1-424 (1968).
22. Central School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB ff 1-399.89 (1968).
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to an employee organization of their own choosing simply means that
when a unit is defined the employees therein may select the organization
to represent them and the policy of "a most appropriate unit" does not
deprive employees of the exercise of this right. Moreover, if experience
establishes that the denial of a separate unit in a given situation results
in ineffective representation this can be considered in a proceeding after
the expiration of the period of unchallenged representation status pro-
vided for in section 208(c) of the Act.
B. Community and Conflict of Interest
It is well settled Board policy that the mere fact that occupational
dissimilarities exist among employees in a proposed unit does not merit
the conclusion that the requisite community of interest is wanting.2 Con-
versely, occupational similarities alone do not warrant grouping employ-
ees in one unit.2 A majority of the representation cases which have come
before the Board presented situations where one employee organization
sought to represent a unit of part of the government's employees and
another employee organization sought to represent or was representing
all of the employees of such government. In these cases the government
usually has a salary plan common to all employees. In addition, all em-
ployees are eligible for the same fringe benefits and personnel policies
are applicable to all employees.20 On such facts it has been concluded that
there is a substantial community of interest shared by all employees so
as to warrant an overall uiit consisting of all the employees, unless there
is evidence in the record which establishes sufficient conflict of interest
between some employees to sustain a separate unit.
2 7
The issue of a conflict of interest has most often arisen in proceedings
involving nonprofessional employees.28 In the City of Ogdensburg case,2
the petitioner sought a unit of hourly paid employees in the highway and
water department. The Director of Representation found that the em-
ployees included in the petition were classified as either noncompetitive
or labor, whereas most other employees of the city were either competi-
tive or exempt. The Director concluded that the noncompetitive and labor
class employees did not have the statutory protection provided by the
procedures applicable to discharge or the imposition of other discipline 0
23. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 202 (Supp. 1968).
24. Sanitation Dep't, 1 PERB fI 1-399.99 (1968).
25. Board of Higher Educ., 1 PERB if 1-407 (1968).
26. Massena Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB if 1-436 (1968).
27. Village of Great Neck, 1 PERB if 1-411 (1968); Mfalone Cent. School Dist, I
PERB if 1-399.29 (1968).
28. The issue of conflict of interest in grouping professional with nonprofessional
employees will be considered infra. See page 524-26.
29. 1 PERB if 1-414 (1968).
30. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75 (Supp. 1968).
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or the statutory protection relating to layoffs.81 Thus it was concluded
that the conflict of interest between noncompetitive employees and com-
petitive employees with respect to job security was such as to preclude
their inclusion in the same negotiating unit.
In a subsequent proceeding, a rather similar case was presented with
the variant that the employer voluntarily accorded to noncompetitive
employees the same protection accorded to competitive employees with
respect to discharge and layoffs. 2 However, the Board concluded that
this voluntary grant of protection was not such as to warrant a different
conclusion than that reached in Ogdensburg, reasoning that the noncom-
petitive employees were not guaranteed the same protection enjoyed by
the competitive employees.
In another case where the blue collar employees had such unique terms
and conditions of employment that the other employees of the employer
would have little interest in the contract demands of the blue collar em-
ployees, it was concluded by the Director of Representation that there
was present a conflict of interest sufficient to justify a separate unit of
blue collar employees. 3 The Board has, however, consistently declined
to separate a small group of blue collar employees from an overall unit. 4
This policy has been dispositive of a series of cases wherein bus drivers
employed by school districts sought a negotiating unit separate from other
nonprofessional employees. 35
Therefore, conflict of interest has been found where the Board has
concluded that there is present such diverse interests in subjects of nego-
tiation among groups of employees that effective and meaningful negotia-
tions would be precluded if all the employees were grouped into an overall
unit.
1. Supervisory Employees
The Taylor Law does not by its terms preclude supervisory employees
from participation in the rights granted to public employees. The term
"public employee" as defined in the Law is broad enough to be all inclu-
sive.33 Thus, while it would seem clear that supervisors are entitled to
31. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 80 (1959).
32. Middle Country Cent. School Dist. No. 11, 1 PERB 1f 1-399.67 (1968).
33. County of Rockland, 1 PERE 1-430 (1968).
34. New York State Bridge Authority, 1 PERB 11 1-399.65 (1968); Saranac Lake
Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB ff 1-399.24 (1968); County of Warren, Case No.
C-0170 (1968).
35. Saranac Lake Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB Uf 1-399.24 (1968); Central School
Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB ff 1-399.89 (1968). However, it is to be noted that in a recent decision
the Director of Representation found a separate unit of bus drivers because of their
unique terms and conditions of employment. Board of Educ., 1 PERB 1 1-440 (1969). This
case is presently being appealed to the Board.
36. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 201(6) (Supp. 1968). "The term 'public employee' means
any person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public
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representation and participation in collective negotiations, it is unclear
whether they may be properly included in the same unit with the "rank
and file" employees.
If one were to look to the private sector for guidance, the answer would
clearly be in the negative. However, the National Labor Relations Act as
amended specifically excludes supervisors from being employees within
the meaning of that Act,37 and other jurisdictions have provided some
form of statutory exclusion of supervisors." Since the New York statute
is silent, to attempt to divine legislative intent requires a review of the
legislative history of the Taylor Law. In this regard, the report the Tay-
lor Committee is most significant because it is regarded as the document
which guided the legislature in enacting the Taylor Act, and it is the only
document available which could be characterized as a legislative history
of the law.39
The Taylor Committee advised caution in adopting the arbitrary rule
of excluding supervisors from employee units, stating: "The effectiveness
of the employees' collective influence on the terms of their employment
in some areas of public employment may be related more to the commu-
nity than to the conflict of, interests between employees and their super-
visors."40 It would seem, therefore, that if a community of interest is
shown to exist among employees and their supervisors, they may be in-
cluded in the same unit unless the supervisory responsibilities give rise
to a conflict of interest outweighing the facts or circumstances which es-
tablished the community of interest. The presence of supervisory respon-
sibilities does not per se compel a finding of a conflict of interest. Rather
it is the type and nature of the supervision that is to be considered.
Where the supervisor may impose discipline, can effectively initiate dis-
ciplinary procedures, or is required to evaluate a subordinate's perfor-
mance, the conflict may outweigh the community.4'
This was the approach utilized by the Board in the State Police case. 2
The ranks of major, captain, lieutenant and sergeant all bear supervisory
employer, except that such term shall not include persons holding positions by appoint-
ment or employment in the organized militia of the state for purposes of any provision of
this article other than sections two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article."
N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 201(8) (Supp. 1968).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
38. Munielpal Employee Relations Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-467(2) (Supp.
1969); Munielpal Employees Arbitration, R.I Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-9.4-2(2) (1968);
State Employment Labor Relations Act, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.81(12) (Supp. 1969);
Oregon Civil Service Rule on Collective Bargaining §§ 98-100(2) (a), in 4 H. Roberts,
Labor-Management Relations in the Public Service 482 (1968).
39. Governor's Comm. Report.
40. Id. at 25.
41. New York State Div. of State Police, 1 PERB § 1-399.32 (1968).
42. Id.
1969]
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responsibilities; nevertheless, the Board concluded that sergeants should
be included in the basic unit with the troopers. The Board noted that
only the commissioned ranks prepare performance ratings and only they
take corrective action in the case of misconduct. These factors, plus
others, compelled the Board to find such a conflict of interest as to pre-
clude the inclusion of these ranks in a unit with troopers.
In finding a basis for a supervisory exclusion one cannot rely upon job
titles alone for, in another case, 3 the Board included lieutenants in a
basic unit with patrolmen. In that case, the chief of police and not the lieu-
tenants assigned the patrolmen. Moreover, the chief determined whether
or not a patrolman would be retained and whether disciplinary action
would be initiated. The record did indicate that the lieutenants occa-
sionally did make recommendations concerning the above matters, but
it did not indicate the weight given to such recommendations. If it were
established that such recommendations were substantially followed, the
result might have been to exclude lieutenants from the basic unit.
The same approach has been applied to other occupations in the public
sector. In many school district cases, for example, school administrators
were excluded because their supervisory responsibilities, including the
hiring of new teachers, the evaluation of performances, and the making
of recommendations involving tenure, gave rise to such conflicts of inter-
est between the principals and teachers that separate representation was
warranted." Nevertheless, principals have been included in the same unit
with the teachers45 when the PERB Director of Representation found
that, even though the principals "theoretically" had the power to make
recommendations about discipline or tenure, such power was rarely exer-
cised4 and, thus, there appeared to be no likely conflicts of interests
sufficient to warrant exclusion from the basic unit. This conclusion was
strengthened by the fact that the record established a history of negotia-
tions wherein the teachers and principals were represented by the one
organization.
It would seem, therefore, that the Board to date would not exclude
from the basic unit those supervisors who are mere assignors of work
or who are working supervisors in the nature of lead men, and who do
not have the responsibility for imposing discipline or effectively recom-
mending it.47
2. Professional Employees
The Taylor Law does not specifically mention professional employees
or their right to separate units. In the private sector the National Labor
43. City of Batavia, 1 PERE f1 1-399.59 (1968).
44. Enlarged City School Dist., 1 PERB ff 1-399.69 (1968).
45. Depew Board of Educ., 1 PERB J 1-399.58 (1968).
46. Id.
47. Town of Mamaroneck, 1 PERB ff 1-420 (1968).
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Relations Act provides that professional employees may not be included
in a unit with other employees unless they vote for such inclusion.
48
Other jurisdictions have adopted this approach .4 Though the Act does
not so provide, the Taylor Committee report, in discussing the concept
of community of interest, appeared to favor the position that separate
units for professional employees be given due consideration.0
One of the first cases to deal with this question involved registered
nurses employed by Chemung County.5' The employer contended that
the appropriate unit should consist of all employees of the county in-
cluding the nurses. The Director of Representation, while noting that
nurses participated in the employer's overall salary plan and enjoyed the
same fringe benefits as all other employees, nevertheless concluded that
the nurses were entitled to a separate unit. He found that the registered
nurses formed "a cohesive group having a substantially different commu-
nity of interest from that of all other employees. 5 - This finding was
predicated on the history of labor relations within the profession, their
common interests in maintaining the status of their profession and their
personal status within it, and the general maintenance of professional
standards. Thus, it was felt that at the negotiating table the nurses
would be interested in subjects which would be of little concern to other
employees, such as the raising of professional standards, in-service edu-
cation, and tuition refunds. 3
Similar reasoning was applied in the Thruway case where all profes-
sional employees were placed in a professional unit. 4 The Director found
that the professional employees had a substantially different community
of interest from that of rank and file employees and, therefore, they could
negotiate effectively only in a separate unit. This finding was based sub-
stantially on the fact that the professional employees' interests at the
negotiating table would necessarily be quite diverse from employees in
the basic unit.
A problem of greater delicacy was presented in the State case" which
involved professional employees from such various disciplines as medi-
cine, law, accountancy and economics. The decision of the Board was to
place all such employees in one professional unit. Admittedly with such
diverse disciplines there must be a divergency of interests. However, the
reasoning of the Chemung and Thruway cases had a viable application
48. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
49. Municipal Employee Relations Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-471(2) (Supp. 1969);
Municipal Employee Relations Act, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 178H(4) (Supp. 1968).
50. Governor's Comm. Report at 24-25.
51. Chemung County, 1 PERB 1 1-415 (1968).
52. Id. at 4043.
53. Id. 1-415; Sullivan County, 1 PERB 1 1-399-53 (1968).
54. New York State Thruway, I PERB ff 1-423 (1968).
55. New York State, 1 PERB 1-424 (1968).
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here. Though the disciplines differed, the interest in the maintenance of
professional standards and status would provide a common bond. Further
experience is necessary to determine whether this grouping of professions
may preclude effective and meaningful negotiations. The desire to avoid
unwarranted fragmentation appears to dictate this approach. Fragmenta-
tion should be granted only where the evidence to support it is clear and
convincing. It is interesting to note that the professionals who comprise
the instructional staff of schools, colleges and state universities have gen-
erally been accorded the right to separate units with little or no dissent.
C. Role of the Employer in Unit Determination
The Taylor Law does contemplate and encourage voluntary recogni-
tion by the employer. 6 Employer recognition involves the same two steps
traditionally recognized in the private sector: first, acceptance of the unit
as appropriate, and second, recognition of the organization as the choice
of the employees in the unit. Two questions have arisen concerning vol-
untary recognitions by public employers. Does the Board have the power
to review the employer's unit determination and set it aside if the Board
determines it is not the appropriate unit? Assuming the answer to the
first to be in the affirmative, the second question is the weight to be
given to the employer's preference in unit determination.
The power of the Board to review and set aside would appear to be
clearly provided in the statute. In the case of the state government,
section 205(5) (b) empowers the Board "[t]o resolve . . . disputes con-
cerning the representation status...." The power of the Board to so act
in a representation dispute involving the state government has been up-
held by the court of appeals. 7 The court stated: "An organization which
disputes the representation status of an employer-recognized organization
may invoke the procedures of the Board under sections 205 and 207 to
obtain Board certification. In that event it may displace the previously
employer-recognized organization ....""
The power to so act in the case of governmental employers within the
state other than the state is equally clear, but its exercise is conditioned
upon the absence of procedures established pursuant to section 206(1).19
This section empowers any government other than the state or a state
authority to establish procedures to resolve representation disputes. The
procedures established, however, are required to be consistent with statu-
tory criteria set forth in section 207 which are the same criteria to be
56. N.Y. Civ. Sere. Law § 204 (Supp. 1968); see State of New York, 1 PERB
1 1-301 (1967).
57. Civil Sere. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 21 N.Y.2d 541, 236 N.E.2d 481, 289 N.Y.S.2d
203 (1968).
58. Id. at 547, 236 N.E.2d at 483, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 206-07.
59. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 205(5) (c) (Supp. 1968).
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used by the Board in resolving representation disputes. Thus, it would
appear to follow that if a local government establishes procedures to
resolve representation disputes then the Board would lack jurisdiction to
review unit determinations made thereunder save for the limited question
of determining whether the procedures established and their implementa-
tion are consistent with the provisions of section 207.
The Board, however, was concerned that the implementation of the
organizational rights granted to public employees would be inhibited if
the local government were to adopt the dual role of employer and adjudi-
cator of representation disputes. Accordingly, the Board in drafting its
Rules of Procedure provided that the limited review as to inconsistency
would be applicable only when the procedures established by a local
government provided for an impartial agency to administer such proce-
dures.60 In the absence of such an impartial agency the scope of review
will extend to the merits of the dispute.61
Thus, the statutory scheme as interpreted by the Board and the courts
to date would not only permit but would also encourage an employer,
confronted with conflicting demands for recognition from two competing
employee organizations, to make an initial unit determination which de-
termination may be challenged and may be subject to review by the
Board.62 It should be pointed out, however, that this construction of the
statutory scheme is not free from doubt. The basic question involved
here is when does a representation dispute arise within the meaning of
sections 205(5) (a), (b) and (c) and 207 of the Act. Specifically, is there
such a dispute when one or more employee organizations request recogni-
tion from the employer as to a negotiating unit which the employer does
not deem to be appropriate, or does a dispute not arise until the employer
has made an initial unit determination or has been accorded an opportu-
nity to do so and has refused to act? Private sector experience would
compel acceptance of the former alternative whereas, as noted above, the
Board and the courts have accepted the latter alternative as the intent
of the legislature. In the private sector, the employer is not permitted to
resolve a substantial representation question even initially by according
recognition to an employee organization.' The NLRB requires an em-
ployer in such a situation to maintain strict neutrality."' The underlying
basis for this policy is that in granting recognition under such circum-
stances the employer is interfering with the free exercise of the rights
of employees to choose their bargaining representative.
60. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 206.1 (1967).
61. Id.; cf. City of Niagara Falls, 1 PERB ff 1-417 (1968); City of Ogdensburg, 1
PERB ff 1-414 (1968); Central School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB ff 1-442 (1969).
62. State of New York, 1 PERB ff 1-301 (1967).
63. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
64. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (194S).
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There is of course a basis for this departure from policy in the private
sector in that there is a substantial difference between private employers
and public employers. Public employers "owe a very special obligation to
the public not owed by private employers ... ,"1 They are motivated not
by profit but by a desire to provide the necessary service to the public
they serve. Therefore, it should be assumed that their unit determination
is made on the basis of what is deemed to be in the interest of orderly
and efficient administration of government. However, this has to be bal-
anced with the full implementation of the rights granted to public em-
ployees in section 203 of the Act. For example, under existing procedure
a public employer could favor one employee organization over another
by making a unit determination that would reflect the organizational
strength of the preferred organization. Further, it has been argued in one
case that the grant of recognition to one of the competing employee orga-
nizations and resultant negotiations with it did result in some interference
with the unfettered exercise of employees' organizational rights. Thus, fur-
ther experience is necessary to determine whether this initial unit deter-
mination by public employers does result in a substantial impairment of
section 202 rights.66
Another question is the weight to be given to the employer's preference
in unit determination. The determination by a public employer of an ap-
propriate unit is entitled to some weight, 7 unless it is not based on some
logical and persuasive considerations. An example of this may be found
in the City of Auburn School District case. 8 There the employee organi-
zation petitioned for certification as the negotiating representative for all
certified employees of the employer. The employer contended that the
principals of its schools should be excluded from the bargaining unit of
teachers. However, there was some evidence in the case that the princi-
pals desired to be included in the unit with the teachers and that the
teachers wished to be joined with the principals. The contention of the
employer, however, was that it was necesary for it to have access to the
principals in the course of negotiations with the teachers and that a single
unit of principals and teachers would deprive the employer of such advice
and counsel. The evidence of record established this contention as a meri-
torious one. The employer had asked the principals for their suggestions
on various matters proposed by the teachers in the course of negotiations.
The principals declined to give such advice to the employer because they
65. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 21 N.Y.2d 541, 548, 236 N.E.2d 481,
483-84, 289 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (1968).
66. City of Ogdensburg, 1 PERB II 1-414 (1968); see King, The Taylor Act-Ex-
periment in Public Employer-Employee Relations, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 12 (1968).
67. County of Warren, Case No. C-0170 (1968); City of Rome, 1 PERB U1 1-429
(1968). See also N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207(1) (c) (Supp. 1968).
68. Enlarged City School Dist., 1 PERB J 1-399.69 (1968).
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considered themselves part of the one unit with the teachers and stated
that all discussions should be limited to the negotiating table.
The Board concluded that the employer's argument, that the exclusion
of principals was required for the discharge of its responsibility to its
constituency, was substantial and that this, with other factors present in
the case, was sufficient to outweigh the desire of the employees for a
single unit. 9
The most significant case to the contrary involved state employees. 0
In that case the state as the public employer created three units of state
employees: members of the New York State Police, the professional staff
of the State University of New York, and a residual unit of all other
state employees. The determination of this residual unit was challenged
by a number of employee organizations. The Board, while recognizing
that some weight was to be given to the employer's determination, never-
theless concluded that the great number of job titles and the occupational
diversities present were of such a nature to preclude effective and mean-
ingful collective negotiation if all were included in a single unit and, there-
fore, determined that this residual unit be divided into five units based
primarily on occupation.7
II. THE SELECTION OF THE EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
A. Employee Organizations
The term "employee organization" is defined in section 201(6) of the
Taylor Law as "an organization of any kind having as its primary pur-
pose the improvement of terms and conditions of employment of public
employees . . . ." The inclusion of the phrase beginning "having as its
primary purpose" has raised questions with respect to organizations
whose membership includes employees in both the private and public
sector. If the definition were interpreted to limit an employee organiza-
tion solely to one which admits to membership only public employees,
this would unquestionably limit the number of organizations which could
be qualified under the Law. However, the Board has not adopted such a
strict interpretation.
In those situations where the employee organization does admit to
membership both public and private employees, it has been held that if
69. Id.; see Board of Educ., 1 PERB U 1-426 (1968), where the Director of Repre-
sentation determined that the evidence submitted by the employer in support of its
preference was insufficient to overcome other evidence. See also Chemung County, 1 PERB
ff 1-415 (1968), where the Director of Representation found that the desire of the
employees (nurses) for separate representation prevailed over the employees contrary unit
determination.
70. New York State, 1 PERE Uf 1-424 (1968).
71. This determination of the Public Employment Relations Board is now under
judicial review.
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the public employee members of the organization select their own negoti-
ating committee and, without participation by private sector members,
ratify negotiation agreements, the organization is an employee organiza-
tion within the meaning of section 201 (6).72 The reasoning of the Board
is that the public employees who are responsible for the conduct of the
negotiations would, therefore, not be submerged in an organizational
structure dominated by private sector employees. Hence, where the in-
dependence of action of public employee members involved is protected,
such organizations have been found to be within the purview of section
201(6) of the Law.
Another question concerning the qualification of an employee organiza-
tion was rised in the Thruway case 8 where an employee organization's
qualification was challenged on the ground that it was employer domi-
nated. The basis of this contention was that managerial personnel were
members of that organization. It was held that so long as no management
member of the organization was permitted any role in the formulation of
the demands of rank and file employees or in the ratification of any col-
lective agreement concerning non-supervisory employees the organization
would qualify.
The Board has also held that no organization may qualify as an em-
ployee organization under section 201(6) if it fails to file financial reports
required by section 726 of the Labor Law of the State. The reasoning of
the Board is that it will not grant status to an organization that does not
comply with the Labor Law.
74
One employer challenged an employee organization's participation in a
representation proceeding on the ground that its membership was not
limited to employees of the employer. The employer contended that only
employee organizations "limited to employees of the employer are entitled
to recognition or certification." 75 The contention was rejected by the
Director of Representation on the ground that there is no specific statu-
tory language which supports this contention.7' Rather, as long as the
employee organization has as its primary purpose the improvement of
the terms and conditions of employment of public employees, it satisfies
the requirements of section 201(6).
B. Showing of Interest
It has long been established in the private sector that a petition for
certification or decertification submitted by an organization seeking to
represent or act on behalf of employees must be supported by a substan-
72. Massena Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 1 PERB U 1-436 (1968).
73. New York State Thruway, 1 PERB ff 1-423 (1968).
74. New York State, 1 PERB ff 1-424 (1968).
75. Union Free School Dist. No. 21, 1 PER.B f 1-405 (1968).
76. Id.
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tial number of employees in the unit which is the subject of the petition."7
This concept has been carried over into the public sector.78
The Taylor Law does not provide any statutory requirement on this
point. The Board, however, does require a showing of interest."0 Where
the petition is filed following the employer's refusal to recognize, the
petitioner must make a showing of interest of thirty percent of the em-
ployees in the unit which the petitioning employee organization alleges
to be appropriate.8" Where the petition is filed by an employee organiza-
tion in objection to an employer's voluntary recognition of another orga-
nization, it must be supported by a showing of interest of ten percent of
the employees either in the unit found appropriate by the employer or in
the unit the petitioner claims to be appropriate.8' Although not provided
in the Rules of Procedure of the PERB, the Board does require a show-
ing of interest by an employee organization seeking to intervene in a
representation proceeding. Here the showing of interest required is ten
percent of the employees in a unit proposed by any one of the parties
including the intervenor.
The Board has followed the practice of the NLRB12 in providing that
the determination as to the sufficiency of showing of interest is an admin-
istrative one and not subject to collateral attack by the parties. 3
C. Determination of Majority Status
The legislature has directed that the ascertainment of the public em-
ployees' choice of employee organization shall be made "on the basis of
dues deduction authorization and other evidences, or, if necessary, by
conducting an election. 8 4 Consequently, the initial question before the
Board was under what circumstances would an election be deemed neces-
sary. Rather than approach this question on an ad hoc basis the Board
decided to provide an answer to this question in its Rules of Procedure.'
77. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
78. Municipal Employee's Relations Act, Mass. Gen. Law Ann., ch. 149, § 178H(4)
(Supp. 1968); Arbitration of School Teacher Disputes, RJ. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-9.3-S
(1968); Oregon Civil Service Rule on Collective Bargaining, §§ 98-200(5), 98-300(3), in
H. Roberts, supra note 38, at 483.
79. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 201.3(a),(b) (1967).
80. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 201.3(a) (1967).
81. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 201.3(b) (1967).
82. Standard Cigar Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 852, 853 (1957).
83. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 201.6(a)(1) (1967);
see Bethpage Schools, 1 PERE ff 1-399.19 (1968); City of Niagara Falls, 1 PERB U 1-399.S7
(1968).
84. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 207(2) (Supp. 1968).
85. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 201.6(h)(2) (1967):
"Direction of an election. If the director of representation determines that an election or
elections shall be held, he shall provide that such election or elections be conducted by an
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The Board defined the phrase "dues deduction authorization and other
evidences" to mean membership in an employee organization plus proof
that such membership is for the purpose of representation in collective
negotiations. Thus, an employee organization may be certified without an
election if it can establish that a sufficient proportion of the employees
have designated it as their negotiating agent and a substantial number of
employees have not designated a competing employee organization. Fifty-
five percent of the employees in the unit is a sufficient proportion for
certification without an election unless a competing organization shows a
"membership plus" of ten or more percent of the employees. 80
The types of proof which have been accepted include a notarized mem-
bership list plus cards designating the organization as the employees'
negotiating agent, 7 a card authorizing dues deductions and also authoriz-
ing the organization to represent the employee, 88 a card constituting an
application for membership in the organization and also designating the
organization as the bargaining agent, 9 and individual affidavits of mem-
bership plus individual cards designating the organization as the employ-
ees' bargaining agent.90 In situations where competing organizations sub-
mit "membership plus" proof covering the same individual employees,
such evidence will not be counted for either organization.01 The Board
has adopted a policy that in order for "membership plus" proof to be
agent of the board at such time and place and upon such terms and conditions as the
board, the director of representation, or the agent may specify." (Emphasis deleted.)
86. Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board § 201.6(h)(1) (1967).
The chart below sets forth the varying percentages:
Column I
(Percentage necessary to be certified with-
out an election)
(Percentage nec
out an election)
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
87. Central School Dist. No. 4, 1 PERB ff 1-399.50 (1968).
88. Village of Greenport, 1 PERB fI 1-399.56 (1968).
89. Town of Brasher, 1 PERB f 1-399.60 (1968).
90. Chemung County, I PERB g 1-415 (1968).
91. City of Utica, 1 PERB Uf 1-399.49 (1968).
Column II
essary to certification with-
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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acceptable the documents must have been executed no more than one year
prior to the filing of the petition for certification.
D. The Necessity of a No-Strike Affirmation
Section 207(3) (b) of the Taylor Law permits the Board to certify an
employee organization as the legal representative of its members only if
the organization has submitted an affirmation that it does not assert the
right to strike or to assist or participate in any strike against any govern-
mental employer. This affirmation is usually made at the time an em-
ployee organization files a petition initiating a representation proceeding.
There have been instances where an employee organization, which has
made such affirmation, has been charged with violating the prohibition
against strikes during the pendency of the proceedingf
2
In the first instance where this occurred, the Director of Representa-
tion for the Board ordered the representation proceeding stayed until the
charge of a violation of section 210 (1) had been resolved. 3 The Director
reasoned that if the charge of violation were sustained it might cause the
Board to "look behind the.., no-strike affirmation and conclude that it
was a sham."94 In that event, the Director concluded that the employee
organization "would not be permitted to participate in any further pro-
ceedings leading to possible certification." 5
The power or right of the Board to deny an employee organization
participation in a representation proceeding on this ground or even to
inquire into the good faith of an employee organization in making a no-
strike affirmation was challengedf 0 It is clear that the Act does not grant
this power explicitly. However, the legislature did expressly provide that
the Board certify an employee organization only when such affirmation
had been submitted.
The purport of such an affirmation is a formal renunciation of the in-
tent to strike against a public employer. Thus it would seem obvious that
the legislature did not intend that such affirmation be "a meaningless
recitation or an affirmation without substance or obligation."07 Accord-
ingly, the Board reasoned that where an employee organization engages
in a strike after making a no-strike affirmation and before certification,
it would be remiss if it failed to inquire into the good faith of the affirma-
tion.
92. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 210(1) (Supp. 1968).
93. Union Free School Dist. No. 26, 1 PERB fI 1-419 (1968).
94. Id. at 4056.
95. Id.
96. Town of Huntington, 1 PERB 1-399.96 (1968).
97. Id.
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The Board, however, modified the order of the Director of Represen-
tation to stay the proceeding, directed that he proceed with the certifica-
tion proceeding but that certification of the employee organization be
withheld until the employee organization demonstrated to the Board that
the affirmation was made in good faith and that the organization had
intended to act in accord with the affirmation.0 8
The procedure adopted by the Director of Representation to deal with
this problem has a distinct advantage in that the guilt or innocence of
the employee organization will have been established prior to any repre-
sentation election so that the public employees involved can make an
informed judgment. However, the obvious disadvantage is that it would
result in a substantial delay in the certification process, thus delaying
implementation of the rights of public employees to collective negotia-
tions.
III. CONCLUSION
The Act of the legislature and the concurrence therein by the Governor
in granting to public employees the right of participation in the deter-
mination of terms and conditions of their employment is a most positive
one. It is to be recognized that the grant of such rights may be produc-
tive of some degree of unrest in the field of public employment through-
out the state. On the one hand, one might find a degree of exuberance, if
not militance, on the part of public employees in the exercise of these
newly found rights. On the other hand, one might expect a degree of re-
sentment on the part of public employers in having to relinquish their
heretofore unfettered exercise of a unilateral determination of terms and
conditions of their employees' employment. However, public employers
and employee organizations are to be commended in view of the fact that
unrest or unlawful activities arising out of disputes concerning represen-
tation status have been relatively few.
The policies of the PERB obviously do not constitute an inflexible or
unchanging approach to the question. Experience will be a teacher; un-
doubtedly there will be changes as a result of the lessons taught by experi-
ence.
98. Id.
